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Although events that lead to currency
crises in countries with pegged or fixed ex-
change rates are the subject of a large and
growing body of literature, how countries get
out of these crises has received less attention.
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This article focuses on how Brazil turned around
after its 1999 currency crisis. We argue that Brazil’s
postdevaluation exchange rate was rapidly sta-
bilized and economic recovery began soon after
because the banking system had been prepared
to withstand not only severe economic shocks
but also severe economic policies.
Brazil’s commercial banks’ high capitaliza-
tion ratios, shrunken loan portfolios, and ex-
panded holdings of government paper allowed
the central bank to take drastic postdevaluation
stabilizing measures that calmed markets and
created the foundations for a relatively quick
economic turnaround without putting the bank-
ing system at risk. The Banco Central do Brasil’s
stabilization policy options were further expanded
because Brazilian private sector foreign liabili-
ties were largely hedged in ways that shifted the
impact of the devaluation from the private to
the public sector.
Most exchange rate crises of the 1990s were
preceded by banking crises. Tensions some-
times surfaced between looser monetary policy
to lower default rates and tighter policy to re-
duce the inflationary pass-through problems
that materialize after a devaluation. Unable to
decide what to do, some countries neither sta-
bilized the banking system nor achieved their
inflation goals. Other countries simply tolerated
giving up one goal to reach the other. In any
case, these countries’ options were different and
more problematic than Brazil’s, in part because
Brazil and its banks had taken steps to avoid
this dilemma of twin crises. To elucidate what
permitted Brazil’s relatively fast postdevaluation
recovery, we begin with an outline of the events
leading to the devaluation.
BRAZIL’S REAL PLAN
Brazil had long had severe difficulties with
inflation. Even in the 1980s and early 1990s,
Brazilian policymakers did not behave as if they
appreciated the connections between (1) a prob-
lematic tax system, (2) fiscal deficits, (3) printing
of money to pay for what taxation could not,
and (4) inflation.
Policymakers seemed to perceive inflation
as a problem solvable by decree and by index-
ing the cost of everything from private school
tuition to power bills on past price movements.
In their periodic efforts to fight inflation, policy-
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makers would typically freeze wages and prices
for a while, stop indexing, and perhaps impose
a fixed exchange rate. The unsustainable fiscal
deficits behind these problems received less
attention.
In 1994 Brazil finally initiated an economic
stabilization plan that showed appreciation for
the linkage between spending, money creation,
and inflation. This Real Plan—named after the
new currency, whose exchange rate system would
be key to inflation-fighting efforts—temporarily
involved indexation. However, the indexation was
tied, through the exchange rate, to the number
of dollars required to purchase a product rather
than to measures of inflation and the currency.
To increase competition and, accordingly,
pressures on oligopolies and monopolies that
historically had been relatively free to raise
prices, Brazil began to liberalize not only foreign
investment restrictions but also trade. Brazilian
tariffs were lowered from an average of 51 per-
cent in 1988 to an average of 14 percent in 1994.
Brazil took steps against what had become
a large federal deficit problem, although they
ultimately were not enough. On the expendi-
ture side, the Congress approved a reduction in
the funds the federal government transferred to
the states and municipalities. On the revenue
side, federal income tax rates were increased.
Monetary policy was restrained gradually.
As the linchpin of this program, the real
was allowed to fluctuate within formally estab-
lished wide and narrow bands that were periodi-
cally adjusted—an exchange rate regime that
lasted from 1995 through early 1999. Figure 1
depicts the wider band.
A small, controlled devaluation had been
built into the system to accommodate Brazilian
deviations from the U.S. inflation rate and, more
generally, some alleviation of ongoing pressures
against the currency. As Figure 1 shows, redefi-
nitions were orderly and regular. Aside from
some instability during Mexico’s financial crisis
of early 1995, the path of the Brazilian real was
smooth and closely controlled.
SOME PROBLEMS PERSIST
Despite reducing inflation below zero by
the end of 1998, the controlled devaluation built
into Brazil’s crawling peg was not enough to
offset fully the effects of earlier differences be-
tween U.S. and Brazilian inflation rates under
the Real Plan. Although there is no hard and fast
definition of overvaluation and no hard and fast
date on which to base the correct valuation
from which we here calculate the overvaluation,
Brazil’s currency had been considered overval-
ued by 15 to 25 percent. The base period used
to calculate the baseline exchange rate has typ-
ically been some time in 1994. We use July 1994
because that is when the Real Plan began.
Figure 2 presents three of many approaches
to measuring exchange rate appreciation
adjusted for inflation-rate differentials and to
assessing degree of overvaluation. All three sug-
gest Brazil’s exchange rate appreciated after
adjustment for inflation. One measure, the J.P.
Morgan broad real exchange rate index, shows
the inflation-adjusted value of the real appreci-
ating by 22 percent between July 1994 and its
peak in early 1998.
Another standard procedure, calculating
the ratio of Brazil’s consumer price index (CPI)
to its wholesale price index (WPI), is designed
to capture the changes in nontradable product
Figure 1
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Figure 2
Proxies for Currency Overvaluation
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prices (proxied by CPI) relative to the prices of
tradable products (proxied by WPI)—and here
reinforces the conclusions one could draw from
the Morgan index. A large increase in this ratio
is a common symptom of the pressures that cul-
minate in a current-account crisis. As the figure
illustrates, this variable shows 1994–98 maxi-
mum appreciation of about 18 percent.
A third characterization of exchange rate
pressures involves the ratio of the WPI to the
nominal exchange rate. As noted above, the
WPI may be seen as a proxy for the prices of
tradable goods, including exports. When the
exchange rate does not adjust sufficiently to
avoid large dollar (or other foreign currency-
denominated) price increases for such products,
foreigners become less interested in purchasing
Brazilian products. Current-account pressures
can materialize that may be difficult to alleviate
without devaluation. Foreign investors know this,
become fretful, and demand higher risk premi-
ums, if they invest at all. The maximum appre-
ciation over 1994–98 was about 22 percent.
In making these comparisons over time,
the starting point of July 1994 is arbitrary in
some senses, even though that is when the Real
Plan began. However, despite the disparities
between the three proxies for exchange rate
appreciation, not one suggests exchange rate
equilibrium in the year before Brazil’s 1999
devaluation. Note also that each measure falls
by year-end. These drop-offs reflect absolute
declines in prices (including CPI and WPI) dur-
ing 1998 and in CPI relative to WPI. By late
1998, these reductions could not offset pres-
sures on the exchange rate.
Although an assortment of difficulties led
to Brazil’s devaluation, one of the most widely
recognized was the nation’s growing fiscal deficit
—a problem that had never been fully solved
despite the efforts expressed through the Real
Plan. Figure 3 breaks down Brazil’s government
deficit between the portion due to interest pay-
ments (interest) and the portion due to the dif-
ference between government expenditures on
goods and services and the government’s in-
come from taxes and fees (primary). The oper-
ational balance is the sum of interest plus pri-
mary. The primary deficit is not overwhelmingly
large on a year-to-year basis. However, the year-
in, year-out persistent accumulation of these
deficits by a country that has a history of debt
defaults or moratoriums clearly discomfited in-
vestors, especially in the context of financial
crises in Asia and subsequently in Russia.
The combination of increasing cumulative
debt together with investor fears, expressed in
high interest rates, resulted in large interest pay-
ment portions of the deficit. In 1998, the two
parts of the deficit depicted in Figure 3 summed
to nearly 8 percent of GDP, of which virtually all
was the interest portion. However, concerns
quickly grew that the reduction of the primary
deficit to almost nil would not last and that the
government would return to its less prudent 
fiscal traditions. Even with the primary deficit
reduction, measures of Brazil’s international
debt-servicing capacity were very weak.
Brazil did not cause the Asian crises of
1997 or the Russian crisis of 1998. However,
Brazil responded to these crises by raising inter-
est rates (Figure 4) in hopes of maintaining its
Figure 3
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Figure 4
Short-Term Brazilian Interest Rates
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exchange rate and holding foreign capital in 
the country. Note the 1997 spike around South
Korea’s financial crises and in 1998 during the
Russian crisis.
One result of Brazil’s interest rate increases
was the drop in Brazil’s industrial production
index (Figure 5). After ups and downs in 1997,
industrial production fell noticeably during the
second half of 1998. The high real exchange
rate (Figure 2), which makes it hard to earn a
profit from foreign sales, also contributed.
Although Brazil’s interest rate increases in
the wake of the 1995 Mexican Tequila Crisis and
the 1997 Asian crises had the expected effect of
raising the demand for Brazilian domestic cur-
rency and holding foreign currency reserves in
the country, interest rate increases after the 1998
Russian crisis had the opposite effect. A fiscal
reform package announced in conjunction with
the interest rate increases lacked credibility—
casting suspicion on the viability of other Brazil-
ian stabilization efforts. Moreover, the interest
rate increases forced up nominal fiscal deficits,
aggravating existing concerns over sovereign de-
fault (Goldfajn 2000).
THE END OF THE CURRENCY BAND
As problems became more acute in 1998
and suspicions mounted about the government’s
commitment to future fiscal balance, some well-
known economists called openly for a Brazilian
devaluation (Dornbusch 1998). Although Presi-
dent Fernando Cardoso had worked to bring
the national budget into balance early in his first
presidential term, during the late 1990s his focus
turned toward reelection.
Once reelected in fall 1998, Cardoso again
addressed Brazil’s budgetary difficulties. At the
end of October, Cardoso announced a new
budget plan intended to save $23 billion. Some
analysts began to forecast federal primary sur-
pluses for 1999, which might offset deficit prob-
lems due to interest payments. In November, a
$41.5 billion International Monetary Fund pre-
emptive program was announced. This was 
intended to warn currency speculators that
attacks on the real would not be worth the
expense.
However, hopes for exchange rate stability
faded as it became clear that many politicians in
Brasilia did not share Cardoso’s declared com-
mitment to fiscal balance. In December 1998, a
deficit reduction bill was voted down in large
part by members of the president’s own coali-
tion. A significant social security reform effort
was voted down for the fourth time. In re-
sponse, the rate of capital outflow from Brazil
accelerated rapidly. With Brazilian foreign cur-
rency reserves in the $30 billion to $40 billion
range, down from a more than $70 billion peak
earlier in the year, daily outflows of $350 million
to $400 million became commonplace.
If a particular event could be said to have
triggered Brazil’s devaluation, it was most likely
Minas Gerais Governor Itamar Franco’s announce-
ment in January that he would suspend his
state’s debt payment to Brazil’s national govern-
ment for three months. This declaration was soon
followed by supportive statements from six other
governors, who expressed interest in renegoti-
ating their own debt. Since investors’ principal
exchange-rate-related concerns had been Brazil’s
ability to maintain fiscal balance, to pay its
debts, and to resist the temptation to pay them
through monetization, capital outflows acceler-
ated further.
A week after Governor Franco’s default
announcement, the head of Brazil’s central bank
resigned and the central bank announced
changes in the nation’s exchange rate band to
allow a 9 percent devaluation. At this time, capi-
tal was flowing out of Brazil at a rate on net of
about $1 billion per day, and the 9 percent
devaluation announcement did not slow it.
As capital flight continued, rumors circu-
lated rapidly—and were rapidly denied—that
the currency would be turned loose from any
band or peg. New central bank Governor Fran-
cisco Lopes, who held the job about two weeks,
repeatedly asserted that the new 9 percent de-
valued exchange rate band would last in per-
petuity.
But just two days after Brazil’s new deval-
ued exchange rate band was announced—less
Figure 5
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time than it takes some games of cricket to be
played—Brazil declared that its exchange rate
would be allowed to float after all. Brazil’s offi-
cial exchange rate arrangement remains a float-
ing regime. Figure 6 represents daily Brazilian
exchange rates from December 1998 through
January 1999, when the exchange rate system
broke down, and on through April. Movements
after January 13 alternated between episodes 
of moderate volatility and stability, but the ex-
change rate clearly strengthened from its weakest
point of 2.11 reais per dollar in early March.
BRAZIL POSTCRISIS: 
EXCHANGE RATES AND OUTPUT
Figure 7 offers a broader perspective on
Brazil’s relatively quick stabilization of the real.
The figure depicts the trajectory of indexed
exchange rates for five currency-crisis countries
of the 1990s. Each nation’s exchange rate with
the dollar equals one unit (Brazilian real, Indo-
nesian rupiah, Korean won, Thai baht, or Mexi-
can peso). Despite early volatility, Brazil’s ex-
change rate stabilizes after sixty-one trading days,
while those of Indonesia, South Korea, Mexico,
and Thailand are still headed upward. By ninety-
one days, Mexico’s exchange rate has begun to
stabilize, but Thailand’s is still climbing, as Thai
officials are unable to wring uncertainty or infla-
tionary expectations out of the market. By 121
days, South Korea’s exchange rate is as stable as
Brazil’s.
To put this exchange rate variance in a
clearer perspective, note that—over the first 130
trading days following each of their devalua-
tions—the standard deviation of the index of
each country’s exchange rate is as follows: Brazil,
10.1; Indonesia, 150.8; Mexico, 23.7; South
Korea, 20.6; and Thailand, 24.2. Thus, using this
measure, Brazil’s exchange rate volatility is less
than half as much as even South Korea’s.
Another way of considering exchange rate
movements is to exclude the first ten trading
days after the original devaluation to show that
some exchange rates settle down quickly and
others are reluctant to stabilize. Figure 8 pre-
sents percentage exchange rate movements for
each of the five currency-crisis countries be-
tween ten and seventy-one trading days after
the initial devaluation.
Figure 6
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Of the five countries, only Brazil has an
absolute decline (signifying a 12 percent revalu-
ation) in the number of domestic currency units
traded per dollar over this period. The rest range
from a 20.6 percent postdevaluation-date deval-
uation (Thailand) to 63.9 percent (South Korea).
Recall that Brazil’s exchange rate was flexible
rather than pegged or fixed during this period.
Figure 9 compares postdevaluation indus-
trial production in each of the five countries
under consideration, offering another example
of the results, in part, of Brazil’s stabilization
policy—a growth turnaround. The figure pre-
sents measures for one through fourteen months
following the devaluation month for each coun-
try, regardless of when the devaluation took
place. The figure shows that Brazil’s industrial
production response to devaluation and subse-
quent stabilization policies was more positive
sooner than the other countries’ responses to
their particular devaluations and stabilizations.
In sum, of the five crisis countries under
consideration here, Brazil stabilized its exchange
rate more quickly than all but (for some meas-
urement periods) South Korea and turned its
industrial production up more quickly than any
of the other four countries. What permitted 
the Brazilians to pursue economic stability and
allowed an output turnaround so much faster
than in the other countries? We argue that an
important reason is the stability of Brazilian
banks compared with those of the remaining
countries.
TWO ROOTS OF EXCHANGE RATE CRISES: 
BANKING WEAKNESS AND FISCAL DEFICITS
To clarify the connection between bank
health and Brazil’s recovery from the 1999 cur-
rency crisis, we present measures of precrisis
fiscal and banking–financial leverage for the
five 1990s currency-crisis countries considered
in this article and show that every country’s cri-
sis was preceded by at least one high-leverage
measure. However, Brazil’s high-leverage mea-
sure did not involve banking. Table 1 presents
an overview, offering a matrix of combinations
of banking–financial and fiscal leverage.
A large economic literature claims that
when countries have high values for banking–
financial or fiscal leverage, investors are more
likely to remove their financial capital than oth-
erwise. In Table 1, the columns account for the
presence or absence of high banking–financial
leverage, while the rows account for the pres-
ence or absence of fiscal leverage problems.
The term banking–financial leverage refers
to the quotient of some measure of bank or
financial assets divided by the value of some-
thing that could allow depositors to get their
money out of a bank or away from the country.
When the likelihood of getting one’s money out
of the bank is under question, one logical denomi-
nator is bank capital. Low leverage, which in
such a case would mean a low ratio of assets to
capital, signifies that banks would have enough
capital to pay off fleeing depositors if asset-
quality problems triggered bank runs. A high
ratio could mean that there is insufficient capi-
tal to pay off depositors and the government
might get the job by default.
Getting one’s finances away from a country
involves other measures of banking–financial
leverage, such as foreign currency reserves. Soon-
to-be ex-depositors or ex-investors may wonder
whether they can convert their domestically de-
nominated currency into foreign currency at the
old pegged exchange rate before the central bank
loses so many reserves that it stops defending
its currency and devalues. The denominator of
Table 1
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a relevant leverage measure could be the vol-
ume of foreign currency reserves. A high bank
assets/foreign currency reserves ratio might mean
insufficient dollars at the erstwhile exchange rate
for all ex-bank-depositors who want to get their
money out of the country.
Measures of fiscal leverage (upper row of
Table 1) typically involve some ratio of how
much a nation must pay to what it has to pay it
with. From the foreign-debt holder’s perspec-
tive, the narrower issue of whether a country
can earn enough foreign currency to pay its for-
eign-currency-denominated debt is of particular
concern. For this category of debt holders, the
fiscal leverages of greatest interest will involve a
denominator that measures foreign-currency
earning capacity.
Table 1 presents combinations of high
banking–financial leverage/high fiscal leverage
(Mexico, 1994; Indonesia, 1997); high banking–
financial leverage/low fiscal leverage (South
Korea, 1997; Thailand, 1997); and low banking–
financial leverage/high fiscal leverage (Brazil,
1999).
2 This table, however, is designed only to
give an overview.
To more fully elucidate these notions of
risk, we begin with characterizations of banking–
financial leverage (Figure 10). The leverage de-
picted by the M2/foreign currency reserves ratio
is perhaps the international economic litera-
ture’s most widely used method for characteriz-
ing banking–financial fragility’s connection to a
currency crisis (Calvo 1995; Sachs, Tornell, and
Velasco 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999; Chang
and Velasco 2000; and Velasco 2000). This ratio
is used as a broad approach for capturing phe-
nomena in which a “prior boom in bank lend-
ing indicates greater weakness in bank balance
sheets and, therefore, more vulnerability” (Sachs,
Tornell, and Velasco 1996, 150).
The ratio of M2/foreign currency reserves
is used as such an indicator because “when cap-
ital inflows suffer a reversal, not only do gross
inflows dry up, but also, holders of liquid
domestic liabilities try to convert them into for-
eign exchange and flee the country” (Sachs,
Tornell, and Velasco 1996, 150).
3 Thus, this
approach to leverage assessment is of the get-
ting away (from the country) form rather than of
the getting out (of the bank) form, both of
which are discussed above. Although the sam-
ple of countries for which we use this ratio is
small, it proxies for a much larger group. Velasco
(2000) notes that at the onset of the Asian crisis,
the same M2/foreign currency reserves ratio 
that appears in Figure 10 was generally higher
for Asian economies than for Latin American
economies.
4
The ratio of commercial bank credit to the
private sector/foreign currency reserves offers a
second, narrower look at the getting away (from
the country) approach to measuring leverage
but with the same analytical results. Here again,
precrisis bank leverage in Brazil is markedly
lower than in the other four currency-crisis
countries (Figure 10).
These two ratios offer bank leverage meas-
ures that are relatively exogenous to government
policy. Thus, as crisis conditions materialize, it
becomes increasingly difficult for the exchange
authorities to manage the size of their reserves.
The ratio of commercial bank credit to 
the private sector/capital, in contrast, is not only
more subject or endogenous to government
control than the previous two ratios, but focuses
on the getting out (of the bank) problem rather
than the getting away (from the country) prob-
lem. Even though this measure of bank leverage
is very different from the other two ratios de-
picted in Figure 10, it also is lower for Brazil
than for any of the other four countries.
In sum, Brazilian banking–financial lever-
age is relatively low whether we are discussing
exogenous measures (M2/foreign currency re-
serves, commercial bank credit to the private
sector/foreign currency reserves) or endogenous
measures (commercial bank credit to the private
sector/capital). We argue that bank capitalization
ratios are relatively endogenous because gov-
ernments can set and sometimes enforce them.
Leverage measures involving foreign currency
reserves are more exogenous than capitalization
ratios because governments cannot control for-
eign currency reserves as easily as they can
Figure 10
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make up and enforce bank capitalization ratios.
Figures 11 and 12 present two widely used
measures of fiscal leverage, each of which
gauges a nation’s ability to earn enough foreign
exchange to service its foreign (and, as in the
case of the five countries here, foreign-currency-
denominated) debt.
5 In contrast to Brazil’s low
bank leverage, these fiscal leverages are very
high for Brazil and low for such countries as
South Korea and Thailand. Brazil’s high lever-
ages can be seen in the countries’ external debt
service ratios (the ratio of countries’ foreign debt
service payments to the income from exports
they use to make these payments) (Figure 11)
and in the ratio of external debt to exports
(Figure 12). Note that after Brazil, the other two
high fiscal leverage countries are Mexico and
Indonesia. Recall that in Table 1 Mexico and
Indonesia fall into the category of high fiscal
leverage and high banking–financial leverage.
Despite the distinctions we have made
between banking–financial leverage and fiscal
leverage, either one can signal possible fiscal
difficulties. After all, if high bank leverage (par-
ticularly as expressed by asset/capital ratios)
signals high likelihood that the government will
assume bank obligations if asset quality deterio-
rates, what may really be scaring investors is just
another fiscal problem.
BRAZILIAN BANK REGULATION 
IS TRANSFORMED IN THE 1990S
What brought about the relative strength
of Brazil’s pre-crisis banking system? As interna-
tional capital markets began to open in the late
1980s, and as the problematic results of domes-
tic financial liberalizations in the industrial
countries also became clear, concerns increased
about the stability of the world’s banks. The
result was a movement to ensure that banks
would be properly capitalized. One manifestation
was the Basle Accord, whose eleven signatory
nations in 1987 agreed to enforce risk-based
capital requirements of 8 percent on all banks
within their boundaries.
Brazil was not among the signatory nations
of the 1987 Basle Accord but did, in 1994, estab-
lish risk-based minimum capital requirements
consistent with the accord. In June 1997, as
banking problems were materializing in Asia, the
Brazilians raised their risk-based minimum capi-
tal requirements from the 8 percent Basle Accord
standard to 10 percent.
6 In November, following
the onset of South Korea’s financial crisis, Brazil
raised the requirement to 11 percent. In 1994,
moreover, absolute minimum capital limits had
been set for any bank, regardless of where these
minimums would place it in terms of risk-based
capital ratios. Commercial banks could have no
less capital than 6 million reais.
Although the legal structure governing the
regulation of Brazil’s banks was obviously chang-
ing, a common problem in Latin America is that
those in charge of bank supervision and regula-
tion do not have the power to enforce the reg-
ulations on the books. The ability of the Banco
Central do Brasil—Brazil’s regulatory authority
for banks—to cause banks to follow its direc-
tives was very limited even during most of the
1990s.
In March 1997, however, new laws per-
mitted the Banco Central do Brasil to demand
that a bank with liquidity problems transfer con-
trol to new management or reorganize through
merger or closure. The central bank could now
Figure 11
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appropriate the equity interests of a commercial
bank’s controlling group and sell it to others. In
1998, the central bank was given new powers to
compel financial institutions to implement sys-
tems of financial controls, also in accordance
with the Basle Committee.
Meanwhile, Brazil took steps to force the
privatization of publicly owned banks. Brazil’s
central bank had long been not only a lender of
last resort to the publicly owned banks, but also
a routine supplier of capital injections to them.
In August 1996, after these institutions’ loan
portfolios went from bad to worse, Brazil issued
new regulations about the conditions for their
rescue. Bailouts would take place, provided 
the banks were either privatized, liquidated, or
transformed into development agencies.
Also in 1996 Brazil’s government began to
permit foreign banks to take control of small
financial institutions. In 1997, in the wake of
government interventions in larger banks, Brazil
allowed foreign controlling interest in these
institutions as well. In the conclusion to a study
of Brazilian bank efficiency, Bevilaqua and Loyo
(1998) argue that, while the new price stability
brought on by the advent of the Real Plan in
1994 weaned banks from profiting from float
and encouraged them toward greater efficiency,
a perhaps more important contribution to bank
efficiency was the new competition imposed by
the introduction of foreign banks.
7
GOVERNMENT POLICIES INDIRECTLY 
AFFECT BANK LEVERAGE
Bank regulation changes and other pru-
dential bank behavior improved bank leverage.
Some Brazilian government policies indirectly
affected leverage also. For example, protracted
central bank tightening in defense of the real
prior to the January devaluation also encour-
aged commercial banks to take asset positions
that allowed them to withstand the economic
turmoil attending most devaluations.
More to the point, as the central bank of
Brazil pushed up interest rates to defend the
currency during the contagion effects from the
Asian crises of 1997 and the Russian crisis of
1998, it not only discouraged borrowing as the
economy began to slow but also discouraged
lending inasmuch as bankers fear that high
interest rates increase the likelihood of default.
The result appears to have been a credit ration-
ing, as characterized by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
The reduction in loan leveraging, as banks
pulled their funds from private sector lending
and placed them in high-yield government
securities, can be seen in Figure 13, which
shows the marked declines in the loans-to-
capital ratio in Brazilian commercial banks. To
offer another perspective, Figure 14 depicts the
ratio of loans to assets and of short-term gov-
ernment securities debt (not including state and
local government debt) to total assets. Over the
period 1995–98, the share of loans declines
while the share of short-term government debt
increases. Although reductions in the ratio of
bank loans to capitalization would be consistent
with the regulatory changes discussed in the
previous section, the magnitude of the ratios in
Figure 13 requires an explanation beyond such
regulations. The portfolio shift depicted in Figure
14 away from loans and toward government
Figure 13
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securities provides an explanation for the drop
in loans-to-capital ratio.
The reduction in Brazilian bank loan lev-
erage has important implications for the persis-
tent debate regarding the optimum time for a
Brazilian devaluation. One argument is that Brazil
should have devalued long before it did. How-
ever, one virtue of waiting until 1999 is that by
then banks had reduced the share of loans in
their portfolios sufficiently to endure the tight
monetary policy that allowed Brazil to stabilize.
The reduction in loans as a percentage of total
bank assets was not instantaneous, but required
adjustment time in response to tight monetary
policies adopted in defense of the currency dur-
ing 1997 and 1998. In this context, it may be
seen that postponing the devaluation resulted in
bank portfolios and bank capitalizations that
allowed the central bank to persist with tight
monetary policies after the devaluation.
There is another more general financial
reason why Brazil’s devaluation did not cause
the Brazilian economy to stagger protractedly.
Unlike what happened in the Asian crisis coun-
tries, the private sector anticipated Brazil’s de-
valuation for at least a year in advance and
hedged against it. For the period of Brazil’s
devaluation, Banco Central do Brasil data show
$95 billion in private sector foreign liabilities 
in the Brazilian economy. Of that $95 billion,
$71 billion was hedged, either through the pur-
chase of such assets as indexed securities ($60.5
billion) or by taking foreign exchange derivative
positions ($10.5 billion). Partly for this reason—
but also because Brazil’s foreign exchange crisis
did not involve a banking crisis as did those in
Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea—
floating the real resulted in little bankruptcy and
modest balance sheet efforts.
BRAZIL’S TIGHT MONETARY POLICY
We argue that banking sector strength
meant Brazil could pursue a tight monetary pol-
icy that would hold down inflation and expec-
tations of it for the future. This could stabilize
exchange rates and consequently create the
investor and consumer confidence to allow the
rapid turnaround in industrial production.
Figure 15 depicts postcrisis monetary ex-
pansion in each of the five crisis nations. The
indicator here is the growth in the monetary
aggregate M2 from the month of each nation’s
exchange rate crisis through the five months
thereafter. To permit full comparability, each M2
is constructed consistently with the International
Monetary Fund’s definitions rather than the par-
ticular nation’s own definition of M2.
During the first five months following their
respective exchange rate crises, Brazil’s and
South Korea’s monetary expansion rates were
markedly slower than those of Indonesia,
Mexico, and Thailand—but Brazil’s was far and
away the slowest. Specifically, cumulative mone-
tary growth for the first five postdevaluation
months was Brazil 1.1 percent, South Korea 5.7
percent, Thailand 8.4 percent, Mexico 15.9 per-
cent, and Indonesia 30.3 percent.
CONCLUSION
One of the most striking aspects of the
Brazilian devaluation is its difference from those
of Mexico, Thailand, and South Korea—among
others—in that financial sector weakness did
not trigger it. Brazil’s January 1999 crisis is
closer to first-generation currency crises than to
other types. These first-generation crises materi-
alize through rising fiscal deficits under a
pegged exchange-rate regime and finite foreign
exchange reserves, leading to a speculative
attack when lender-imposed credit limits are
reached.
The Indonesian, South Korean, Mexican,
and Thai crises fit the second-generation model.
The literature on such crises emphasizes sudden
capital outflows due to changes in market sen-
timent—a movement from a good equilibrium
to a bad one. However, in such cases, it is so
common for a banking crisis to precede the cur-
rency crisis (see Calvo and Mendoza 1996, for
example) that some kind of reckoning of the
banking sector liabilities becoming government
liabilities seems to be part of the phenomenon.
Figure 15
M2 in the Crisis Countries
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Whether a necessary connection exists between
second-generation models and banking crisis lit-
erature, substantial twin crisis literature (for ex-
ample, Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999, McKinnon
and Pill 1996) links these crises in ways that the
first-generation models do not.
Based on Brazil’s experience, if a country
is going to follow the first-generation model on
its unfortunate route to a currency crisis, there is
much to recommend preparing for the devalua-
tion by strengthening the banking system’s cap-
italization, lowering its loan leverage, and in-
creasing its efficiency.
8 Taking steps to allow the
private sector to hedge against an impending
devaluation, as also occurred in Brazil, can sim-
ilarly aid the subsequent turnaround. Defending
one’s currency with high interest rates long
enough to induce bankers to reduce lending and
increase bond holding may be a third approach
to preparing for a strong turnaround.
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Brazil’s experience offers a perspective on
the twin crisis literature of the 1990s, in which
the focus is on the connection between banking
system weakness and a currency crisis. While
we think the twin crisis literature has much to
recommend it, we have attempted to broaden
consideration of the relation between banking
system health and currency crises. Not only
banking system weakness but also banking sys-
tem health affects the options governments have
in defending their currency or, once the cur-
rency is floated, stabilizing it.
NOTES
I wish to thank Jennifer Afflerbach, Kenneth Robinson,
Mark Wynne and Carlos Zarazaga for their sugges-
tions for improving this paper.
1 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), which is among the
most significant and well-known documents on
currency crises to appear in years, does raise the
issue of factors leading away from crises, but the
article’s principal emphases are (1) the connections
between currency crises and financial crises and 
(2) the factors leading up to such crises. In Kaminsky,
Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998), the emphasis is also 
on factors leading up to the crises rather than what
overcame them.
2 For discussion of these various combinations of
problems, see (for Mexico) Kamin and Rogers (1996),
Calvo and Mendoza (1996), Kaminsky (1998), and
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and (for the Asian
countries) Kodres and Pritsker (1998) and Kaminsky
and Schmukler (1999). Complications arise, however.
In Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999), fiscal issues most
trigger stock market jitters in two countries: Indonesia,
which we would expect, and Thailand, where fiscal
problems do not play a role (Table 1).
3 The preceding two quotations are Sachs, Tornell, and
Velasco’s explanations for their use of M2/foreign
currency reserves as an indicator of commercial bank-
related pressures leading to currency crises.
4 Extending the explanation of the usefulness of this
ratio, Velasco (2000, 10) describes “a situation in
which expectations of devaluation generate a sharp
fall in bank deposits. Banks lend long and borrow
short. Thus, they will not have enough money in their
vaults to cover their liabilities.”
5 As examples of evidence that such leverage may scare
away foreign investors, Cosset and Roy (1991) and
Lee (1993) show inverse relationships between debt
service or similar ratios and debt ratings of the large
rating services such as Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s.
Dooley (2000), however, develops a model in which
debt service cost minimization is shown to be an ineffi-
cient policy for governments in developing countries
because such policies increase the cost of default.
6 The idea of risk-based capital requirements is that
loans require more capitalization to account for asset
recovery problems than, say, government bonds.
Accordingly, the weights that express the capital
requirement for loans are heavier than for the govern-
ment bonds. In 1997, when the Brazilians raised the
overall risk-based capital requirement to 10 percent,
they also increased the weights, so the average
capital requirement went up more than was expressed
simply by a move from 8 percent to 10 percent.
7 For a contrast to Brazil’s experience, consider the
observations of Radelet and Sachs (1998, 30). They
note South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand “had
initiated but not completed financial sector liberaliza-
tion and reform. The partial reforms had led to increas-
ingly fragile financial systems, characterized by
growing short-term foreign debt, rapidly expanding
bank credit, and inadequate regulation and supervision
of financial institutions. These weaknesses, in turn, left
the Asian economies vulnerable to a rapid reversal of
capital flows.” For a perspective on comparative bank
conditions, note that two months after each country’s
devaluation, nonperforming plus in-arrears loan ratios
at private commercial banks were Brazil 7 percent,
Mexico 12.3 percent, and South Korea 13.3 percent.
8 Pushing the lender-of-last-resort function offshore—
instead of keeping it within the central bank—by
inviting foreign banking institutions to operate in one’s
country would also serve to strengthen the system in
this case.
9 Brazil’s adoption of formal inflation targeting as a
measure to make its stabilization policy more transpar-
ent may be seen as a way of enhancing this credibility
further, but in fact markets had already begun to settle
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